On the Ninth Circuit\u27s New Definition of Piracy: Japanese Whalers v. the Sea Shepherd-Who are the Real  Pirates  (i.e. Plunderers)? by Dubner, Barry H. & Pastorius, Claudia
Barry University School of Law
Digital Commons @ Barry Law
Faculty Scholarship
2014
On the Ninth Circuit's New Definition of Piracy:
Japanese Whalers v. the Sea Shepherd-Who are the




Barry University School of Law, claudia.pastorius@law.barry.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://lawpublications.barry.edu/facultyscholarship
Part of the Admiralty Commons, Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, Criminal Law
Commons, International Law Commons, and the Law of the Sea Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ Barry Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by
an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Barry Law.
Recommended Citation
Barry Hart Dubner & Claudia Pastorius, On the Ninth Circuit's New Definition of Piracy: Japanese Whalers v. the Sea Shepherd-Who
are the Real "Pirates" (i.e. Plunderers)?, 45 J. Mar. L. & Com. 415 (2014).
Journal of Maritime Law & Commerce, Vol. 45, No. 4, October, 2014
On the Ninth Circuit's New Definition of Piracy:
Japanese Whalers v. the Sea Shepherd-Who
are the Real "Pirates" (i.e. Plunderers)?
Barry Hart Dubner* & Claudia Pastorius**
I
PREFACE
No good deed goes unpunished!
I was recently in St. Malo, Brittany, France, walking on top of a fortress
wall that was built centuries ago to protect and forewarn the local people
from marauding pirates/corsairs. As I was walking along and observing the
water and the two fortresses built near the wall, I wondered how on earth a
group of courageous people who were attempting to curtail the Japanese
whalers from killing untold numbers of whales under an unenforceable
whaling treaty could be called "pirates" by the Ninth Circuit? Was plunder-
ing a whale population in the Antarctica under the guise of "scientific
research" considered lawful commerce? Were the environmental activists
seeking to rob, murder or otherwise engage in piratical acts? Or, were they
seeking to defend a resource?
As the author of the first book on the subject of piracy in the late 1970s
and numerous articles on the law of the sea, and a member of the December
2009 "think tank" panel at the Harvard Kennedy School which convened to
combat the Somali piracy crises,' I was taken aback by the Ninth Circuit's
decision in the Institute of Cetacean Research i. Sea Shepard Conservation
*Barry Hart Dubner, Professor of Law, Barry University, Dwayne 0. Andreas School of Law,
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research goes to Cheryl Yolanda Watson, B.S., University of the West Indies; J.D., Barry University,
Dwayne 0. Andreas School of Law.
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'See Robert I. Rotberg, World Peace Found. (WPF), Combating Maritime Piracy: A Policy Brief with
Recommendations for Action, at 2, POL Y BRiEsupmi" #11 (Jan. 26. 2010).
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Society case.2 The Ninth Circuit applied the "plain meaning" rule to a 1982
international treaty article defining piracy,3 which was anything but "plain."4
The Court also used the United States Alien Tort Statute (ATS) to obtain
jurisdiction over an act that was not recognized as a crime requiring univer-
sal jurisdiction by the international community,6 (i.e. environmental inter-
ventionism). Further, the Ninth Circuit may have misinterpreted the proper
treatment of the comity concept in regards to international jurisdiction.'
Since other authors have previously discussed the issues regarding the ATS
and comity in the Ninth Circuit decision, however, this article is limited to
the court's erroneous redefinition of piracy using the plain meaning rule.9 On
this aspect, I find it necessary to set forth my thoughts on the historical and
legal development of the crime of piracy.
II
INTRODUCTION
You don't need a peg leg or an eye patch. When you ram ships; hurl glass con-
tainers of acid; drag metal-reinforced ropes in the water to damage propellers
and rudders; launch smoke bombs and flares with hooks; and point high-
powered lasers at other ships, you are, without a doubt, a pirate, no matter how
high-minded you believe your purpose to be."
linst. of Cetacean Research v. Sea Shepard Conservation Soc'y, 708 F.3d 1099 (9th Cir. 2013),
amended by 725 F.3d 940 (9th Cir. 2013).
'United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, S. Treaty
Doc. No. 39, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 1833 U.N.T.S. 397, art. 101 (1982) [hereinafter UNCLOS], available
at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention-agreements/texts/unclos/unclos-e.pdf.
Furthermore, the United States has not even ratified 1982 UNCLOS. Division for Ocean Affairs and
the Law of the Sea, Office of Legal Affairs, United Nations, Chronological Lists (J" Ratifications of
Accessions and Successions to the Comention and the Related Agreements as at 29 October 2013 (Sept.
20, 2013), available at http://www.un.org/depts/los/referencefiles/chronological-lists-of_
ratifications.htm# The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (last visited Aug. 25, 2014).
4Inst. of Cetacean Research v. Sea Shepard Conservation Soc'y, 725 F.3d at 943-44.
'Id.
'Samuel Shnider. Universal Jurisdiction Over "Operation of a Pirate Ship": The Legality of the
Evolving Piracy Definition in Regional Prosecutions, 38 N.C. J. INTL L. & COri. Rt.G. 473, 482-85
(2013). ".... jurisdiction over piracy is recognized only over conduct 'which constitutes piracy by inter-
national law. . . .' However, while UNCLOS provides a definition of piracy, it does not criminalize the
offense, prohibit individual conduct, or provide for the punishment for the offense." Id. at 483, 496.
'Anthony L.I. Moffa, Comment: Two Competing Models of Activism. One Goal: A Case Study of Anti-
Whaling Campaigns in the Southern Ocean, 37 YALE J. INT'l. L. 201, 203-04 (2012).
'See Keefe, infra note 134 (criticizing the Ninth Circuit's treatment of the comity concept in the
case).
'See Shnider, supra note 6.
"Inst. of Cetacean Research v. Sea Shepard Conservation Soc'y, 725 F.3d at 943-44.
Who are the Real Pirates?
In the Institute of Cetacean Research (Cetacean) v. Sea Shepherd
Conservation Society (Sea Shepherd) case, the lower court in the Western
District of Washington first denied granting an injunction for Cetacean, who
engages in lethal whaling activity in the Southern Sea for "research," against
Sea Shepherd, who engages in anti-whaling interventionism." As the court
noted, Sea Shepherd's direct activism techniques include throwing butyric
acid in glass containers, smoke bombs, and flares with hooks at the whaling
ships and attempting to foul the rudders with reinforced towing lines.' 2 The
lower court also noted that Sea Shepherd's activities have resulted in no doc-
umented harm to a person, and de minirnus damage to the whaling ships in
over eight seasons. 3 The lower court did not find that Cetacean made a valid
claim for piracy under the Alien Tort Statute because environmental inter-
ventionism to protect marine life was not recognized as a crime constituting
a "specific, obligatory, and international norm.""
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the lower court decision, holding
that the court erred by limiting the scope of the term "private ends" in the
definition of piracy to private financial gain. 5 The lower court reasoned that
"[i]n the ordinary case, pirates seek financial enrichment, the prototypical
private end. Sea Shepherd is uninterested in financial gain; it seeks to save
the lives of whales in the Southern Ocean."' " The Ninth Circuit disagreed
and granted Cetacean an injunction, by holding that "private ends" includes
"those pursued on personal, moral or philosophical grounds such as Sea
Shepherd's professed environmental goals. That the perpetrators believe
themselves to be serving the public good does not render their ends public."' 7
The purpose of this article is to stop courts from misinterpreting the "pri-
vate ends" requirement of the piracy definition of the 1982 United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea Treaty (UNCLOS), 8 by including envi-
ronmental interventionists who seek to protect mankind from such persons
who seek to destroy wildlife and the environment. In addition, this article
seeks to stop courts from incorporating a specious definition of piracy into
the United States' domestic criminal law, considering that the term "private
ends" is ambiguous at best.
"Inst. of Cetacean Research v. Sea Shepherd Conservation Soc'y. 860 F. Supp. 2d 1216, 1233 (2012),




"Inst. of Cetacean Research v. Sea Shepard Conservation Soc'y, 725 F.3d at 943-44.
'6Inst. of Cetacean Research v. Sea Shepherd Conservation Soc'y, 860 F. Supp. 2d 1216, 1233 (2012),
rev'd Inst. of Cetacean Research v. Sea Shepard Conservation Soc'y, 725 F.3d at 943-44.
"Id. at 944.
"See UNCLOS, supra note 3.
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The questions this article raises include, inter alia: If pirates are considered
enemies of mankind,'" how should we consider persons who devastate and
destroy our environment? Who are the real enemies of mankind and earthly
inhabitants? Who would you rather describe as a "pirate"-a company that is
seeking to dump toxic waste in our waters or interventionists who seek to
stop it? Are pirates a group of whalers who openly ignore commercial whal-
ing provisions of an international treaty by killing minke whales in the
Antarctica and elsewhere? Or, are pirates interventionists who seek to protect
the whales from these massive killings by attempting to show the people of
the world the catastrophe of the hunting of whales? Who are the real
"pirates?"
For the purposes of understanding the customary/conventional definition
of piracy, how does one measure an act of "violence?" Does throwing a rock
against a ship qualify? 21 Would we be best served calling the rock thrower a
"pirate?" Navigation and commerce have been cherished goals since the
time of Grotius because shipping goods by the sea is the most common and
least expensive form of transportation. 2 ' Of course, the "freedom of naviga-
tion" includes the right to use the ocean without being under attack from
pirates or terrorists.22 That freedom, of course, implies that the navigation
and commerce are being done for lawful purposes.
Why would a Japanese whaling outfit use a United States district court to
obtain a preliminary injunction against alleged "pirates?" Was it the fact that
no other country saw fit to interrupt the Watson 3 group from continuing their
"interventionist" ways? Why did the Ninth Circuit reverse the district court's
decision in such a disconcerting manner?
In so doing, the Ninth Circuit turned centuries of historic understanding
of customary law regarding the definition of piracy on its head by use of a
"plain meaning rule." The Court used the Webster's dictionary to define the
"public ends" requirement of the conventional definition of the crime of the
sea piracy, in order to apply it to environmental interventionists who were
seeking to prevent the killing of thousands of whales by a Japanese govern-
ment-sponsored industry.' The Ninth Circuit also relied on an obscure
Belgian case as "international precedent" and piracy statutes that were
enacted by Belgium after the case was decided.
"See. e.g.. Shnider, supra note 6, at 489.
'See United States v. Abdi Wali Dire, 680 F.3d 446, 453 (4th Cir. 2012).
"See generally Hugo Grotius, MARE LIBERUM, Thi FREEDOM Or THE SEAs, trans. R. van Deman
Magoffin, ed. J. B. Scott (New York: Oxford University Press, 1916).
22 H.E. Jose Luis Jesus, Protection of Foreign Ships against Piracy and Terrorism at Sea: Legal
Aspects, 18 INT'L J. MARINE & COASrAL L. 363, 363 (2003).
rPaul Watson is the notorious leader of the Sea Shephard organization. See infra note 121.
'Inst. of Cetacean Research v. Sea Shepard Conservation Soc'y, 725 F3d at 943-44.
'lid. at 944.
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The word "piracy" conjures up images that have caused terror to mankind
throughout history.26 A pirate was a robber, a murderer, and a plunderer who
attacked merchant vessels and towns by the coast.2 7 To call the Watson-led
group of Sea Shepherd people "pirates" is simply beyond the pale.
This article will review the Ninth Circuit's decision to see if it was correct
in holding that these interventionists were "pirates," rather than considering
their acts of violence as maritime torts. In order to discuss the proper use of
terms, it is necessary to look at the "legislative" history of the definition of
piracy found in UNCLOS.2 8 Even though the Ninth Circuit used a "plain
meaning" rule to define "private ends,"' this article will demonstrate that the
Sea Shepherd participants and the Sea Shepherd Corporation have not actu-
ally committed acts of "piracy."
III
HARVARD DRAFT
A. On Arriving at the Definition of Piracy Including the Term "Private
Ends"
The Harvard Draft Convention on Piracy first developed the term "private
ends" to distinguish piracy-those acts which are committed for private
ends-from those acts committed for "political" ends, such as acts of ter-
rorism. I Under the Harvard Draft discussion, the commentators stated that,
[i]f the forces or employees of any state or government by mutiny or other-
wise should seize a ship and use it to plunder on or over the high seas on their
own account, this, of course would be piracy and fall under the common juris-
diction. The acts would be committed for private ends, not for public ends,




It is quintessential to the law of treaties that the plain meaning of terms
should be used as the first step of interpreting treaty obligations, but not as
"Jesus, supra note 22, at 363.
27See, e.g.. Id.
"Although the United States has ratified the 1958 convention on the high seas, it has yet to ratify the
1982 UNCLOS. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
'Inst. of Cetacean Research v. Sea Shepard Conservation Soc'y, 725 E3d at 943-44.
"See Harvard Research in International Law, Draft Convention on PiraLy with Comments, 26 AM. J.
iNrTL L. Sup. 739, 798 (1932) [hereinafter Harvard Draft].
ld.
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a means of invoking an outcome that contravenes the intentions of the par-
ties. In the authoritative text, The Law of Treaties, Lord McNair explained,
Plain terms. Many references are to be found in judgments, opinions, and
other documentary sources (British and others) to the primary necessity of
giving effect to the 'plain terms' of a treaty, or construing words according to
their 'general and ordinary meaning' or their 'natural signification' and so
forth, and of not seeking aliunde for a meaning 'when the terms are clear.'
But, this so called rule of interpretation like others is merely a starting-point,
a prima facie guide, and cannot be allowed to obstruct the essential quest in
the application of treaties, namely to search for the real intention of the con-
tracting parties in using the language employed by them. 2
Furthermore, Emmerich de Vattel enunciated that when the common
understanding of a term by the parties of a treaty has been established, such
meaning should not be more strongly construed as a means to resolve par-
ticular conflicts. An example of this principle follows that,
[i]n the interpretation of Treaties, compacts, and promises, we ought not to
deviate from the common use of the language, unless we have very strong rea-
sons for it. And,-'When we evidently see what is the sense that agrees with
the intention of the contracting parties, it is not allowable to wrest their words
to contrary meaning.' It is plain that the framers of this Treaty intended to
exclude the 'mouths of Rivers' from the common possession. Ought we, by
construing the terms of the Treaty most strongly against the nation where the
River in dispute may happen to be, to 'wrest their words to a contrary mean-
ing?' I think not.3
... [I]n the first place you must examine whether the words in their natural
meaning make sense in the circumstances before seeking to attach any other
meaning to them, well and good. But it is constantly employed, both by advo-
cates and tribunals, as an argument against seeking to find out what was the
intention of the parties in using the words, having regard to the surrounding
circumstances. It is in truth a petition principia because it begs the question
whether the words used are, or are not, clear-a subjective matter because
they may be clear to one man and not clear to another, and frequently to one
or more judges and not their colleagues. -
Therefore, we turn to the Harvard Draft in order to have a better under-
standing of jurisdictional concepts concerning the crime of piracy. The
importance of the Harvard Draft is that it was the basis of the definition of
3-2Lord McNair, THE LAW OF TREATIES 366 (1961) (emphasis added).
331d. at 373 (quoting Emmerich de Vattel, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW
§ 267 (1758) (chapter 2, On the Interpretation of Treaties)).
'lid. at 372.
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piracy in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the high seas and the 1982 defini-
tion of piracy in the UNCLOS, which are the same. The 1932 Harvard Draft
was based upon the works of experts and professors, led by Joseph
Bingham." The study itself was very comprehensive and it has been used
and cited in different texts.3 6 The main question they were addressing was:
What significance did piracy have on the law of nations?
37
Specifically, the drafters of these articles considered the questions:
[h]ow are we to treat the problem of piracy today in light of the possibility of
international agreement for suppression? Ought we simply to give conven-
tional form to international usage in the matter, without any reference to the-
oretical controversies? Or ought we, within reasonable limits, to combine the
principles of penal and international law and so prepare a draft showing spe-
cific characteristics of piracy, and at the same time, by the strict application of
the universally accepted principles, settling all controversies hitherto regard-
ed as insoluble?"
The perspective of the drafters on the issues was influenced by the fact
that by 1932, all forms of sea piracy had virtually ceased to exist. 9
Therefore, the drafters were interested in putting together articles that could
easily be ratified by various nations with hardly any dispute with the result-
ing definition of piracy (i.e., it was "expeditious")."
In response to the queries at hand, the Harvard Draft set forth the opinions
of various legal philosophers, historians as well as famous jurists.41 The
"comments" to the draft articles demonstrated a wealth of knowledge on the
nature of piracy and the intent of the participants in arriving at each term,
including "private ends." The Harvard Draft articles were originally pre-
pared for "expeditious reasons," which established consistency in the defi-
nition of piracy and an important point of reference for the international
community. 2 Significantly, a close look at the study indicates that the Ninth
Circuit should not have applied the "plain meaning" rule because the crime
of piracy has historically been defined as a crime involving murder, may-
hem, hijacking, kidnapping for ransom and plunder."
3 Harvard Draft, supra note 30, at 749-65, 786.
mSee generally Harvard Draft, supra note 30.
"Harvard Draft, supra note 30, at 749.
"Harvard Draft, supra note 30, at 753.
"See generally Royal Naval Museum Library, A BRIEF HISTORY OF PIRACY (2002), available at
http://www.royalnavalmuseum.org/info-sheets-piracy.htm (last visited Sept. 15, 2014); See also id. at
755-56.
41See Harvard Draft, supra note 30, at 755-56.
"Id. at 749-65.
12See id. at 786.
"'See id. at 790.
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Article 3 of the Harvard Draft addressed piracy as including an act of vio-
lence or depredation, committing rape, wounding, enslaving, imprisoning,
or killing a person with intent to steal or destroy property, for private ends
"without bona fide purpose of asserting a claim or right."' Article 4 of the
original Harvard Draft indicated the elements that were necessary in order
to be considered a "pirate ship."45 Article 4 states that "[a] ship is a pirate
ship when it is devoted by the persons in dominant control to the purpose of
committing an act described in the first sentence of paragraph 1, of Article
3. .. ,"46
Was piracy considered a crime or an offense against the law of nations?
The draft indicates that expressions ". . . like the additional one that pirates
are enemies of the human race, have a vituperative quality which empha-
sizes the gravity of the former dangers of piratical enterprises to the sea-
borne commerce of the world and the coasts of sea-fearing nations. 47
Continuing, the drafters said,
[e]xtravagant hyperboles, though they are common they are used as a reason
for the legal rule that every state participates in a common jurisdiction to cap-
ture pirates and their ships on the high sea, and to prosecute and punish for
piracy persons who lawfully are seized and against whom there is proper
ground for prosecution [ ... ]. Piracy is by the law of nations a special, com-
mon basis of jurisdiction beyond the familiar grounds of personal allegiance,
territorial dominion, dominion over ships, and injuries to interests under the
state's common protection.48
According to Blackstone, pirates are the ones that have "renounced all the
benefits of society and government has reduced himself afresh to the savage
state of nature, by declaring war against all mankind, [and] all mankind must
declare war against him: so that every community hath a right, by the rule of
self defence, to inflict that punishment upon him . . . "
In the discussion regarding whether piracy is subject to universal juris-
diction or not, the commentators stated that, "[i]nterational law piracy is
only a special ground of state jurisdiction-jurisdiction in every state.""0 The
drafters further elucidated that
The theory of this draft convention, then, is that piracy is not a crime by the
law of nations. It is the basis for an extraordinary jurisdiction in every state to
'Id. at 743 (emphasis added).
"'Id. at 822.
9id.
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seize and to prosecute and punish persons, and to seize and dispose of prop-
erty, for factual offences which are committed outside the territorial and other
ordinary jurisdiction of the prosecuting state and which do not involve attacks
on its peculiar interests. The purpose of this convention is to define this
extraordinary jurisdiction in general outline. Universal adoption of the draft
convention would not make the piracy defined by it a legal crime or tort by
force of a convention alone. Such a result would be reached under the law of
a state only through the operation of the state's legal machinery."
Regarding the definition of the word "ship," the drafters placed no restric-
tion on the type of boat. For example "junks ... motor boats and even rafts
may be used by pirates. 52 Off the coast of Somalia they use skiffs. 3 One
draft comment noted that in "history and fiction commonly used ships and
the pirate ship and the pirate are associated in one's mind much as are the
Cossack and his horse.'
'
According to Article 3 of the Harvard Draft,
[p]iracy includes any of the following acts, committed outside of the territori-
al jurisdiction of any state: any act of violence or depredation committed with
intent to rob, rape, wound, enslave, imprison, or kill a person or with intent to
steal or destroy property, for private ends without any bona fide purpose, of
ascertaining a claim of right provided the act is connected with an attack on
or from the sea or in the air.5
Article 3 reveals that one difficulty of drafting a definition of piracy for the
purpose of conventional law is that:
The traditional idea of a pirate is a bold and definite one. It pictures a profes-
sional robber who sails the sea in a pirate ship to attack and plunder other
ships or communities which can be reached from the sea. At least if they do
not discriminate between nationalities in choosing ships or settlements to
attack, such pirates are a menace to the interest of every state which has access
to the sea, and therefore this traditional conception seems to justify in favor of
all such states a common legal right, and perhaps reciprocal duties, to prevent
piracies and to punish pirates.56
"Id. at 760. This is an interesting view and it applies really to a discussion of the application of the
alien tort doctrine to this particular case.
12 td. at 768.
S3 ee generally The Dow Project, Identification guide .for Dhows, Skiffs and Whalers in the High
Risk Area (2011), available at http://www.shipping.nato.int/Documents/Identification%20guide%
20for%20Dhows%20Skiffs%20and%20Whalers.pdf.
'Harvard Draft, supra note 30, at 768.
" d. at 768-69.
6Id. at 769.
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The commentators agreed that there was no authoritative definition but
they spoke in terms of a "typical piracy" and referred to the acts aforemen-
tioned. 7
Sir Leoline Jenkins, who was judge of the Admiralty, defined piracy as
robbery, which is committed on the sea.
A robbery when it was committed upon the land, does imply three things: (1)
that there be a violent assault; (2) that a man's goods be actually taken from
his person or possession; (3) that he who is despoiled be put in fear thereby.
When this is done upon the sea, when one or more persons enter on board a
ship with force and arms, and those in the ship have their ship carried away
by violence, or their goods taken away out of their possession and put in a
fright by the assault, this is piracy . . .
Historically, a "pirate," according to Hall, either belongs to no state or
organized political society, or by the nature of his act he has shown his inten-
tion and his power to reject the authority of that to which he is properly sub-
ject."59
The Harvard Draft professors, jurists, et. al., addressed many historical
elements of piracy to arrive at a definition of piracy for expeditious reasons.6'
Notably, each element concerned some form of violence and depredation in
connection with the act of piracy for "private purposes" (i.e., for profit). The
main sentiment regarded the pirate as "merely a robber of the vulgarest and
cruelest kind; but they also took into consideration that these acts could be
done for political ends, although the act aninus fitrandi was wanting and
there was no thought of discriminatory aggression upon vessels of all
nations."'"
The act of piracy had to be an act of violence adequate to a degree but it
did not necessarily have to be an act of depredation. The commentators cited
in the Harvard Draft thought the acts on the high seas should include rob-
bery committed by using a private pirate ship to attack another ship.62 This
is the typical piracy of history and fiction; or intentional, unjustifiable homi-
cide for private ends; unjustifiable imprisonment of a person accomplished
for private ends; and any unjustifiable violent act a person similarly com-
mitted for private ends; and any unjustifiable deprivation or malicious





6 d. at 773 (quoting Lawrence, INTERNATIONAL LAW, Sec. 102, 232-34 (5th ed.)).
9d.
"Id.
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Oppenheim, in his fourth edition of his International law treatises, is cited
throughout the Harvard Draft.' He believed that "in the regular case of pira-
cy, the pirate wants to make booty; it is the cargo of the attack vessel which
is the center of his interest, and if he might free the vessel and crew after
appropriating the cargo ... "' The act of piracy according to the commen-
tator seemed to include cruising (in a pirate ship) with the purpose of com-
mitting any of the offenses aforementioned.6 According to the recommen-
dation, "cruising as professional robbers in a ship devoted to the commission
of such offences," is also an act of piracy.67
The definition of piracy arrived at in treaty law was very restrictive to the
classic form of piracy because the relative diminution of piracy at the time
left little question as to the essential acts being proscribed. Among other ele-
ments that are considered in the comments are robbery on land; robbery at
sea; various acts of depredation committed for private ends on land, either
by professional robbers or by other than professional robbers.s Further ele-
ments included, "an intention to acquire wealth; an intention to attack indis-
criminately the nationals and ships of all states; an intention to disclaim all
state allegiance and state authority; [and] a menace to the commerce or other
interests of all states."" According to the report of the Sub-committee of the
League of Nations Committee of Experts for the Progressive Codification of
International Law,
[tihe confusion of opinion on the subject of piracy is due to failure to draw a
clear distinction between piracy in the strict sense of the word, as defined by
international law, and piracy coming under the private laws and treaties of
individual States. In our view, therefore, it would be preferable for the
Committee to adopt a clear definition of piracy applicable to all States in
virtue of international law in general. °
In the end, "[t]he draft convention exclude[ed] from its definition of piracy
all cases of wrongful attacks on persons or property for political ends."71
Again, the crime of sea piracy was always connected with the violence or
depredation in the crimes of robbery, murder, plundering, kidnapping, and
others historically associated with sea piracy. Today, the word "depredation"
and the conventional definition of piracy are accompanied by the word
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"force" in order to "color our mental pictures of piratical enterprises. 7 2 As
far as the commentators were concerned,
it is clear that the function of this draft convention-the definition of the com-
mon jurisdiction of all states of certain types of major offences committed
beyond the territorial jurisdiction of every state-will not be well accom-
plished unless the common jurisdiction (and therefore as a matter of conven-
ient terminology, the definition of piracy) covers all serious offences other-
wise like traditional piracy, although the motive of the offender may be an
intention to slay, wound, rape, enslave or imprison or to destroy property, and
not an intention to rob or to gain wealth otherwise.'
So, it is apparent what the drafters of the convention meant by the term pira-
cy. This clear meaning is not found in any dictionary under the term "private
ends."
Justice Story in U.S. v. The Malek Adhel stated,
[ilf he (a pirate) willfully sinks or destroys an innocent merchant ship without
any other object then to gratify his lawless appetite for mischief, it is just as
much piratical aggression, in the sense of the law of nations, and of the act of
congress as if he did it solely and exclusively for the sake of plunder, lucri
causa.74
According to Wheaton on his treatise on International Law,
[t]o constitute piracy jure gentium it is necessary, 1 st, [t]hat the offence, being
adequate in degree,-for instance, robbery, destruction by fire, or other injury
to persons or property,-must be on the high seas, and not within the territo-
rial jurisdiction of any nation; and, 2d, [t]hat the offenders, at the time of the
commission of the act should be in fact free from lawful authority ... In short,
they must be in the predicament of outlaws.""
The Ninth Circuit decided to expand the meaning of "private ends" by use
of the plain meaning rule and also by citing, as precedent, a Belgian case,
which will be discussed later.76 However, according to the intention of the
Harvard drafters, citing Bynkershoek, "pirates" are
... persons who depredate by sea or land without authority from a sovereign.
The definition, like most other definitions of pirates and piracy, is at once too
wide and too narrow to correspond exactly with the acts which are now held





7 Inst. of Cetacean Research v. Sea Shepard Conservation Soc'y, 725 F.3d 940, 943-44 (9th Cir.
2013).
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external characteristic by which, next to their violent nature, are chiefly
marked. Piracy includes acts differing much from each other in kind and in
moral value; but one thing they all have in common; they are done under con-
ditions, which render it impossible or unfair to hold any state responsible for
their commission. A pirate either belongs to no state or organized political
society, or by the nature of his act he has shown his intention and his power
to reject the authority of that to which he is properly subject.77
According to the Harvard Draft, the term "private ends" is also used to dis-
tinguish piracy from acts committed for political ends, such as acts of ter-
rorism.78
According to the Report of the Sub-Committee of the League of Nations,
it was believed that,
[c]ertain authors take the view that the desire for gain is necessarily one of the
characteristics of piracy. But the motive behind the acts of violence might be
not the prospect of gain, but rather hatred or a desire for vengeance. In my
opinion it is preferable not to adopt the criterion of desire for gain, since it is
both too restrictive and contained in the larger qualification both for 'private
ends.' It is better, in laying down a general principle, to be content with the
external character of facts without entering too far into the often delicate ques-
tion of motives. Nevertheless, if the acts in question are committed from pure-
ly political motives, it is hardly possible to regard them as acts of piracy
involving all the important consequences which follow upon the commission
of that crime. Such a rule does not assure any absolute impunity for the polit-
ical acts in question, since they remain subject to the ordinary rules of inter-
national law.79
Missing from the Sea Shepherd situation are truly "wicked" and morally
depraved motives on the part of the environmental interventionists.
According to the address of Nicholas Trott, Judge of the Vice-Admiralty and
Chief Justice of the Province of South Carolina, "the evil and wickedness [of
piracy] ... is evident to the reason of all men. So that it needs no words to
aggravate the same: it is so destructive of all trade and commerce between
nation and nation... "I The word "hostis humani generis" is neither a def-
inition, nor as much as a description of a pirate, but a rhetorical invective to
shew the odiousness of the crime."'"
Also missing from the Sea Shepherd situation is "belligerent" conduct
similar to what Justice Brown described in the Ambrose Light case.12 When
"Harvard Draft, supra note 30, at 799.
'lid. at 798.
7'lid. at 802.
lid. at 804 (emphasis added).
"Id.
'l2Id. See The Ambrose Light. 25 F 408, 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1885).
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discussing the acts of a "belligerent" vessel, he mentioned that the term
"piracy" describes an offense "as committed in 'a spirit and intention of uni-
versal hostility,' which has occasionally been employed in describing the
practice of general pirates, rather than the essential elements of piracy
itself."3 The Sea Shepherd case did not contain a situation where there was
indiscriminate violence and robbery on the high seas. Sea Shepherd's
intended purpose was to protect whales and block the Japanese whalers from
killing whales for commercial purposes indiscriminately in violation of a
treaty that Japan (and the United States) signed on to.'
Extremely important is the fact that "the intention of universal hostility,"
in any special sense, is applicable to professional pirates only (i.e., those
who make piracy a business and who indiscriminately plunder, those who
are "general pirates")." Professional pirates are, in other words,
a description of the supposed practice of one class of pirates only; just as
the animusfurandi is descriptive of the particular motive of most piracies. But
neither the general intent in the one case, nor the particular and common
motive of plunder in the other, is necessary or essential to the offense of pira-
cy itself. And it is manifest that the offense may be as complete, though but a
single act be committed or intended, as if such acts were practiced as a busi-
ness and indiscriminately on all vessels to procure a livelihood. 6
One modem example of piracy conducted as a business is the Somali pira-
cy, which is executed for financial gain by organized "professionals" and
funded by financiers.87
Furthermore, missing from the Sea Shepherd situation is the fact that pira-
cy traditionally involves a declaration of hostility to the social order of the
whole world. According to the commentators,
[i]ndeed a clever plunderer might diminish greatly his risks of punishment
under such a limitation of jurisdiction, strictly and impartially applied, by
attacking the commerce only of the weaker and distant states or by conceding
immunity to the commerce of one or two great states where police forces were
uncomfortably potent."
mId.
mSeeSEA SHEPHERD.ORG, WHO WE ARE, available at http://www.seashepherd.org/who-we-are/ (last
visited Sept. 16, 2014). During the drafting of this article, the International Court of Justice ruled that the
Japanese whaling activity in the Southern Seas violated the 1946 International Convention for the
Regulation of Whaling. Australia v. Japan: New Zealand intervening, Int'l Ct. of Justice, March 14,2013,
available at http://www.icj-cij.orgldocket/files/148/18136.pdf.
'See Harvard Draft, supra note 30, at 805.
'Harvard Draft, supra note 30, at 805.
"Jeffrey Gettlernan, Somali Pirates Tell Their Side: They Want Only Money, NizwYoRKTIME S.COM,
Sept. 30, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/01/world/africa/Olpirates.htn-?_r0.
n'Harvard Draft, supra note 30, at 807.
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The Harvard drafters also considered a report of the Sub-Committee of the
League of Nations that stated,
According to international law, piracy consists in sailing the seas for private
ends without authorization from the Government of any State with the object
of committing depredations upon property or acts of violence against persons.
The pirate attacks merchant ships of any and every nation without making any
distinction except in so far as will enable him to escape punishment for his
misdeeds. He is a sea-robber, pillaging by force of arms, stealing or destroy-
ing the property of others and committing outrages of all kinds upon individ-
uals.89
One could hardly classify Sea Shepherd's conduct as hostile to the whole of
the world and adverse to the interests of all nations.
The many attempted definitions of piracy have been considered both too
wide and too narrow according to Wheaton' ° In considering the subjective
aspect of the crime of piracy, Dana stated, "the motive may be gratuitous
malice, or the purpose may be to destroy, in private revenge for real or sup-
posed injuries done by persons of classes by a particular national authori-
ty."" The Harvard Draft commentators thought that it would be "important
to exclude thus specifically cases of violence committed in asserting a claim
of right which should not be assimilated to piracy, or at any rate, could not
be assimilated by common consent of all states." 2 In deciding that piracy
does not include acts with the purpose of "asserting a claim of right" the
drafters noted that the element of the "intent to rob" in the definition of pira-
cy can be alternately met with the "intent to slay, wound, imprison, or
enslave." 3 Therefore, the drafters excluded from consideration as piratical
acts common conflicts at sea such as, the "quarrels of fishermen of different
nationalities." 94
Thus, it is clear that the Sea Shepherd's acts were neither contemplated as
a form of piracy by the Harvard drafters, nor do their acts meet the essential
elements of piracy as acts universally hostile to humanity, imbued with vio-
lence and depravity, and committed with deplorable motives. Furthermore,
it is plain that the term "private ends" originated as a means of distinguish-
ing true piracy, which offends every state, from sanctioned "public" acts of
particular states. Your authors leave the subject of the Harvard Draft and the





9 Harvard Draft, supra note 30, at 808-09.
11Id.
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tiously and turn to the definition of piracy as adopted by the 1958 Geneva
Convention on the high seas and the United Nations under the 1982 UNC-
LOS.
IV
CONVENTIONAL DEFINITIONS OF PIRACY
The definition of "piracy" was not based on centuries of customary inter-
national law.95 Rather, it was proposed for "expeditious" drafting of articles
on piracy that the Harvard drafters thought had been dead for centuries."
The definition is, at best, ambiguous, due to the "private ends" requirement.
By calling the environmental interventionists "pirates," the Ninth Circuit
decision will provide fodder for criminalizing a tort.97 In fact, the Sea
Shepard group was not charged with the crime of piracy. 8 How could they
be found guilty of the crime of piracy under this ambiguous and vague def-
inition? Without being charged? The Japanese called them "pirates" and the
Ninth Circuit agreed." The court has opened the door for severe repercus-
sions, without even finding them guilty of the crime of piracy. In fact, the
question remains unsettled as to whether the conventional definition of pira-
cy is too vague for criminal prosecution.
A. Definitions
Piracy was defined the same way in both the Geneva Convention on the
High Seas and UNCLOS, as a crime committed on the high seas:
Article 101. Definition of piracy
Piracy consists of any of the following acts:
Any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, commit-
ted for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private
aircraft, and directed:
On the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or prop-
erty on board such ship or air craft.
'See generally id.
'See generally id. See also The Dhow Project, supra note 53.
'See R. Chuck Mason, Piracy: A Legal Definition, Congressional Research Service, Dec. 13, 2010,
available at http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41455.pdf.
"See generally Inst. of Cetacean Research v. Sea Shepard Conservation Soc'y, 725 F.3d 940, 943-44
(9th Cir. 2013).
"Compare Id., with SeaShepherd.nl, Japanese Government Prepares Special Anti-Sea Shepherd
Laws, Aug. 2008, available at http://www.seashepherd.nl/news-and-media/news-080824-l.html.
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Against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction
of any State;
Any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an air-craft
with knowledge of facts making it a pirate-ship or aircraft;
Any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in sub-para-
graph (a) or (b).
Article 102. Piracy by warship, government ship or government aircraft
whose crew has mutinied
The acts of piracy, as defined in Article 101, committed by a warship, gov-
ernment ship or government aircraft whose crew has mutinied and taken con-
trol of the ship or aircraft are assimilated to acts committed by a private ship
or aircraft.
Article 103. Definition of a pirate ship or aircraft
A ship or aircraft is considered a pirate ship or aircraft if it is intended by the
persons in dominant control to be used for the purpose of committing one of
the acts referred to in article 101. The same applies if the ship or aircraft has
been used to commit any such act, so long as it remains under the control of
the person guilty of that act.
Article 104. Retention or loss of the nationality of a pirate ship or air-
craft.
A ship or aircraft may retain its nationality although it has become a pirate
ship or aircraft. The retention or loss of nationality is determined by the law
of the State from which such nationality was derived.
Article 105. Seizure of a pirate ship or aircraft
On the high seas, or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any state,
every state may seize a pirate ship or aircraft, or a ship or aircraft taken by
piracy and under the control of pirates, and arrest the persons and seize the
property on board. The courts of the State which carried out the seizure may
decide upon the penalties to be imposed, and may also determine the action to
be taken with regard to the ships, aircraft or property, subject to the rights of
third parties acting in good faith.
Article 106. Liability for seizure without adequate rounds.
Where seizure of a ship or aircraft on suspicion of piracy has been effected
without adequate grounds, the State making the seizure shall be liable to the
State the nationality of which is possessed by the ship or aircraft for any loss
or damage caused by the seizure."
'"UNCLOS, S. Treaty Doc. No. 39, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., 1833 U.N.T.S. 397, art. 101-107 (1982).
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Prior thereto, the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas had defined
"piracy" as follows:
Article 15.
Any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, commit-
ted for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private
aircraft, and directed:
On the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or prop-
erty on board such ship or aircraft.
Against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction
of any State;
Any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an air-craft
with knowledge of facts making it a pirate-ship or aircraft;
Any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in sub-para-
graph (1) or (2) of this article.""
There was no change in the conventional definitions of "piracy" from 1958
through 1982.02 Before explaining why there was no change and why the crime
of piracy was defined in international law as taking place on high seas rather
than in territorial waters, it is first necessary to look at another definition.
The International Maritime Bureau (IMB) is a specialized division of the
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC)."3 The IMB is a non-profit
organization, which was established in 1981 to gather material and act as a
focal point in the fight against all types of maritime crimes and malprac-
tice.' 4 For statistical purposes, the ICC defined piracy as, "an act of board-
ing or attempting to board any ship with the apparent intent to commit theft
or any other crime and with the apparent intent or capability to use force in
the furtherance of that act.""' The ICC definition covers both actual and
attempted acts at sea or otherwise, excepting only unarmed petty thefts."°
'Convention on the High Seas, April 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312 (1962), 450 U.N.T.S. 82 [here-
inafter Geneva Convention], available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/
conventions/8_1 1958_high-seas.pdf.
"°See supra notes 100 & 101.
"INT.RNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BuEiwAu, http://www.icc-
ccs.orgicc/imb (last visited Sept. 16, 2014).
1wid"
" See ICC, Piracy and Arned Robbery against Ships Annual Report, Jan. I - Dec. 31, 2009, at 3, avail-
able at http://www.icpat.or-/index.php/documentation-a-articles-mainmenu-97/doc-download/i -piracy-
report. Starting in 2010, the IMB annual reports adopted the UNCLOS. art. 101, definition of piracy. ICC
COMMERCIA, CRIME SERVICES, IMB PmACY REPoRTNG CENTRE, http://www.icc-ccs.org/piracy-reporting-
centre (last visited Sept. 16, 2014).
"*Id. at 3.
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The rationale for the IMB's use of the above definition was that the major-
ity of piracy acts occur under the jurisdiction of States, and the piracy defi-
nition under the Geneva Convention and UNCLOS only applies to piratical
acts that occur on the high seas.' 7 The IMB noted that the International
Maritime Organization (IMO) at its 74th meeting of the Maritime Safety
Committee (MSC) addressed this definitional matter in the Draft Code of
Practice for the Investigation of Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery
against ships." The Code of Practice defines "Piracy" and "Armed Robbery
against ships" as follows:
Piracy means unlawful acts as defined in article 101 of the 1982 United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea UNCLOS. Piracy consists of any
of the following acts:
Any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, commit-
ted for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private
aircraft, and directed
On the high seas; against another ship or aircraft or against persons or prop-
erty on board such ship or aircraft;
Against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction
any State;
Any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft
with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;
Any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in sub-para-
graph (a) or (b).
Armed Robbery against Ships means "any unlawful act of violence or deten-
tion or any act of depredation, or threat thereof, other than an act of "piracy,"
directed against a ship or against persons or property on board such ship, with-
in a State's jurisdiction over such offences."'"
The IMB definition was established "for statistical purposes" and defines
piracy and armed robbery in such a way that the definition covers actual or
attempted attacks in any water, be it internal, territorial or the high seas.""
The difference in the treaty and the trade association definitions highlights
the pragmatic significance of actual piratical acts to the international com-
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and international treaties resulted from a careful examination of historical
acts and legal principles, the definition that was used to compile data on
piracy acts served the purpose of combating actual piracy and informing the
maritime stakeholders of the incidents that might affect their day to day
operations."2
The definition of piracy under both the Geneva Convention and UNCLOS
is lacking, in the sense that it does not give notice to potential defendants
that their conduct is criminally punishable."3 For adequate due process
notice on what conduct will be punishable, there has to be "a generally
accepted interpretation of [the] defined crimes and a custom for all conduct
falling within the broad scope that is actually punishable in national
courts.""4
The Ninth Circuit found that the defendants committed acts of sea piracy
based upon a definition that does not define the acts in a manner that would
give defendants notice."5 Prior to the Sea Shepherd case, Judge Davis of the
District Court of the Eastern Virginia found that, contrary to his colleague
Judge Jackson, the "crime of 'piracy' as defined by the UNCLOS, is cus-
tomary law, and proceeded to read the provisions of article 101 as though
they were written into the U.S. criminal statute.""'
The definition of "pirate ship" under UNCLOS Article 103 is ambiguous
and "is circular because it defines 'pirate ship' as a ship intended to commit
any of the acts of Article 101, which includes the voluntary operation of a
pirate ship, if 'acts' is interpreted to include Article 101(b)." 7
According to Shnider,
[a] reading that narrows Article 103 to ships intended for illegal acts of vio-
lence would also give piracy two different meanings in the Convention: pira-
cy resulting from a violent attack (Article 101 (a) only), and other 'nonvio-
lent' forms of piracy, including crew and facilitators. This distinction might
mean that the right of visit in Article 110 and the right of arrest in Article 105
are only applicable to violent piracy. It might also mean that Article 101 (b)
only applies to crew who assist a violent attack, but not those who assist cruis-
ing."
18
"'See id. at 2.
"'See supra notes 100 & 101.
1"Shnider, supra note 30, at 527.
"'Compare id., with Inst. of Cetacean Research v. Sea Shepard Conservation Soc'y, 725 F.3d 940,
943-44 (9th Cir. 2013).
1
61d. at 527-28 (citing United States v. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d 599, 640-42 (E.D. Va. 2010)
("Defendants were fairly warned of the potential criminal liability they faced for their conduct.")).
11ld. at 509.
"'ld. at 509-10.
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As previously noted, the Harvard Draft, due to the different views on the
subject, was attempting to arrive at a definition of piracy for expeditious rea-
sons, and not as a substantive crime."9 The Harvard Draft was a compilation
and clarification of existing international law, which led directly to the
Geneva Convention and UNCLOS definitions of piracy.2'- While interna-
tional law develops over time, expanding or re-interpreting the treaty defini-
tions to include "crimes" that are not mentioned in or even related to the
crimes in the Harvard Draft (like acts to protect marine life), is a baseless
leap.
It is difficult to believe how the Sea Shepherd participants could reason-
ably foresee that their acts could be seen as piratical in nature, even though
they foolishly called themselves "pirates" for publicity purposes.'2 ' It is also
confusing to call them pirates in the case because, unlike in the Eastern
District of Virginia cases, Sea Shepherd has not been indicted for the crime
of piracy.' 22 They are being classified as pirates under jurisdiction obtained
by the Alien Tort Statutes. 2 1 It is the opinion of your authors that it would be
wiser not to expand a definition of piracy in this situation but rather, if nec-
essary, to find that Sea Shepherd committed tortious acts. Ultimately, there
is no sound basis for finding their acts to be piratical in nature and there is
no historical basis in the definition of piracy.
In an interesting article on the matter, Debra Doby set forth a detailed dis-
cussion of the "private ends" requirement in the UNCLOS definition of pira-
cy.'24 She pointed out the fact that in distinguishing between an objective and
subjective definition of the term piracy,
an objective definition may remove the legal impediments to capturing
pirates; however, it does not resolve the states' continued and well-grounded
reluctance to classify a broader range of ship attacks as piracy. The state's
reluctance may be prudent as the mere label of "piracy" carries broad powers
which grants the courts of any nation jurisdiction over any citizen suspected
of piracy."
"'Harvard Draft, supra note 30, at 786.
2 See generally id.
'For example, see the film on Sea Shepherd founder, Paul Watson, entitled "Pirate for the Sea."
PIRATE tOR THE SEA, SYNOPSIS, http://www.artistsconfederacy.com/pirateforthesea (last visited Sept. 16,
2014).
'*2See, e.g., United States v. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d 599, 599 (E.D. Va. 2010); United States v. Abdi
Wali Dire, 680 E3d 446, 446 (4th Cir. 2012).
'"Inst. of Cetacean Research v. Sea Shepard Conservation Soc'y, 725 E3d 940, 943-44 (9th Cir.
2013).
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Doby points out that the obvious problem with the Ninth Circuit's decision
is that they are attempting to "broadly interpret" private ends to encompass
violence committed for core personal, moral or philosophical grounds.2 6
She also points out that this interpretation has significant consequences
because,
first, this interpretation allows a greater number of acts of violence, depreda-
tion, to qualify as piracy. Further, when an attack is labeled as piracy, it
becomes subject to universal jurisdiction and it carries an inherent, serious
obligation for all nations to respond with all due haste and prosecute to 'the
fullest extent.' This far-reaching obligation to eradicate piracy carries political
consequences in each state.'
2
1
It is your authors' contention that if a court has to use a "plain meaning"
definition of "private ends" to describe the blanks left by the international
definition, created originally by the Harvard Draft professors, then there is
no criminal act of piracy by those standards. Even defining piracy as a tort
is a novel legal concept. The international definition is not suitable enough
to follow as a doctrine of law except in clear instances, such as Somali pira-
cy, where certain Somalis in skiffs or mother ships attack and hijack ships,
kidnapping and murdering passengers aboard.' 8 Somali piracy represents
the classical view within the definition of the universal definition of piracy
in UNCLOS. 29 Taking the leap from a criminal element in piracy consisting
of hijacking, murder, plunder (e.g., Somali piracy), to environmental inter-
ventionism, left the court defining the crime of sea piracy in an uncommon
manner, with highly questionable results.
The interventionists were trying to block Japanese whalers from killing
whales, in violation of the International Convention for the
Regulation of Whaling.'30 The United States recognizes this treaty.'3 The rest
of the interventionist countries (except Australia and New Zealand) did noth-
ing to intervene. The plain language rule led the court to stray, as the court's
holding does not fit within the bounds of the definition of the crime of
piracy.
To prevent these acts of the interventionists, the Japanese filed a lawsuit.




"'See. e.g.. Gettleman, supra note 87.
"'See id.
"'See International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946, 62 Stat. 1716, 161
U.N.T.S. 72 [hereinafter ICRW].
"See Michael Bowman, "Normalizing" The International Convention For The Regulation Of
Whaling, 29 MIcH. J. INT'i, L. 293, 416 (2008).
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Circuit in his analysis of the Ninth Circuit's decision. 132 In both Keefe and
the Ninth Circuit's analysis, there is silence concerning the events that led
up to the acts of the interventionists. Both the Ninth Circuit and Keefe oper-
ated on the assumption that the Japanese were simply issuing permits for
"scientific" reasons that they claimed were allowed by the whaling conven-
tion. 33 However, after the Ninth Circuit decided this case, the International
Court of Justice chastised the Japanese government for creating sham scien-
tific studies." This was something that the rest of the international commu-
nity understood for a long period.' 5 Keefe pointed out that,
the injunctive and declaratory relief sought in the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Washington, was based on four grounds of the United
States Alien Torts Statute (ATS) piracy claims; ATS safe navigation claims;
admiralty claims; and civil conspiracy. The Ninth Circuit held that the District
Court had erroneously failed to issue the preliminary injunction against Sea
Shepherd, and wrongfully dismissed the Institute's ATS piracy claims. All
federal district courts are granted subject matter jurisdiction to establish
whether a violation of the law of nations is actionable under the ATS.'
Keefe cited the Sosa i Alvarez-Machain case, where, "the Supreme Court
held that the ATS might permit suits of violations of modern norms compa-
rable to the paradigmatic late-eighteenth century norms of the law of
nations, namely offenses against ambassadors, violations of safe conduct,
and acts of piracy. '37 Further, he was quick to point out that the "actionable
ATS violations of international law must concern specific international and
obligatory norms."'38 The Ninth Circuit decision to expand the definition of
piracy under the ATS is more confounding considering that U.S. courts with-
in the same district have been split on whether the "typical" acts of piracy
meet the "specific, universal and obligatory standards of international law
claim s .'3
Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit held that UNCLOS and the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts established international norms for ATS purposes, and the
plain language of the treaties defines piracy in a way that certainly included
"'Ryan A. Keefe, Case Comment: International Law, Ninth Circuit Issues Preliminary Injunction
Recognizing Activist Conservation Society As Pirates - Institute of Cetacean Research v Sea Shepherd
Conservation Society, 708 E3d 1099 (9th Cir. 2013), 36 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'I. L. RFv. 461, 472 (2013).
"'See id. See also Inst. of Cetacean Research v. Sea Shepard Conservation Soc'y, 725 F3d 940, 943-
44 (9th Cir. 2013).
"Australia v. Japan: New Zealand intervening, Int'l Ct. of Justice, March 14, 2013. available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/148/18136.pdf.
"'See generally Bowman, supra note 133.
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Sea Shepherd's Conservation Society's actions.1"All of this discussion was
premised on the fact that, "the activities on the Japanese whalers were
authorized and in compliance with the International Whaling Commission
of which the United States is a member."' 4'
Additionally, the court relied on a Belgian case, Castle John v. NV
Mabeco, that they called "precedent" on the matter.42 The court in Belgium
held that environmental activism qualifies as a private end.'43 In citing the
case, the Ninth Circuit said that the Abbott case was "entitled to consider-
able weight."'" Thus, it concluded that the term "private ends" included
"those pursued on personal, moral or philosophical grounds, such as Sea
Shepherd's professed environmental goals. That the perpetrators believe
themselves to be serving the public good does not render their ends pub-
lic."
In the Castle John case,
the members of the environmental group "Green Peace" took action on the
high seas against two vessels engaged in the discharge of noxious waste, in
order to attract attention to the harmful effects of such discharge at sea. The
action included boarding, occupying and causing damage to the two vessels.
The operators of the vessels instituted proceedings before the Belgian courts
for injunctions to prevent interference with their discharge operations on the
high seas ....
The Court of Appeal of Antwerp held that the Belgian courts were enti-
tled to exercise jurisdiction over their own nationals in such circumstances
because the action at issue amounted to piracy for which the exclusive appli-
cation of the law of the flag State could not be claimed [and] the defendants
appealed. The appeal was dismissed.'
The court in the Castle John case pointed out also that "[t]he applicants
did not argue that the acts at issue were committed in the interest or to the
detriment of a State or State system rather than purely in support of a per-
sonal point of view concerning a particular problem, even if they reflected a
"Ilnst. of Cetacean Research v. Sea Shepard Conservation Soc'y, 725 F.3d 940. 943-44 (9th Cir.
2013).
''Keefe, supra note 132, at 465. The ICJ case refuting the notion that the Japanese whalers were in
compliance with the ICRW was not decided at the time of the Ninth Circuit's decision, however, the
knowledge of violations of Japanese whaling violations were notorious. See Australia v. Japan: New
Zealand intervening, Int'l Ct. of Justice, March 14, 2013. available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/148/18136.pdf.
"Inst. of Cetacean Research v. Sea Shepard Conservation Soc'y, 725 F.3d at 944.
"'See Cour de Cassation [Cass.] Castle John v. NV Mabeco, Dec. 19, 1986, 77 I.L.R. 537 (BeIg.).
4'Inst. of Cetacean Research v. Sea Shepard Conservation Soc'y. 725 F.3d at 944 (citing Abbott v.
Abbott, 560 U.S. 1, 130 S. Ct. 1983, 1993, 176 L. Ed. 2d 789 (2010)).
145Id.
+NV Mabeco, 77 I.L.R at 537.
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political perspective." '147 There was no other basis for the Belgian court's
decision. There was really no explanation as to why the Belgian court called
this act of attempting to prevent toxic waste from being dumped in the
waters by two ships, an act of piracy encompassed by the term "private
ends."'14 However, the decision did lead to proper legislation creating legal
repercussions for "pirates" causing environmental harm caused at sea.49
The Castle John case was decided in 1986, before the government of
Belgium had a piracy statute on the books. 5 That statute was enacted
December 30, 2009.151 It was created so that Belgium could try Somali
pirates that might attack one of the flagged vessels (i.e., when such an attack
occurred earlier Belgium did not believe that they had jurisdiction).11
2
Interestingly enough, the Belgian statute includes a provision stating that if
an act of piracy endangers the safety of shipping or the "protection of the
environment" its punishment ranges from the normal 10-15 years imprison-
ment to 15-20 years of imprisonment. 5 ' So, damage to the environment is an
aggravating factor as far as punishment of acts of piracy is concerned in
Belgium.
The Ninth Circuit, however, rejected the idea that the Japanese whalers
came into court with "unclean hands" and decided that the equities in this
situation favored the Sea Shepherd."
While your authors do not think that the claim of piracy should have been
found and upheld in the Sea Shepherd situation, of course, acts of violence
at sea should not go unpunished. However, addressing environmental inter-
ventionist acts that become violent under the legal guise of sea piracy is not
the proper legal ground. After all, if a United States appellate court found
that they committed acts of piracy, then the Japanese may argue that they can
employ any means to stop them. By calling the environmental intervention-
ists "pirates," the Ninth Circuit encourages the Japanese to retaliate with vio-
lence at sea against Sea Shepherd for interfering with their whaling opera-
tions or seeking their prosecution as "pirates" in Japan.
47NV Mabeco, 77 I.L.R at 540.
" See id.
"See Belgian legislation on combating piracy at sea. art. 4, section 3, Dec. 30, 2009.
101d.
"'Belgian legislation on combating piracy at sea, Dec. 30, 2009, available at
http://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILESIBEL-legislation to combat_
piracy.pdf.
"2Public International Law & Policy Group, Piracy Definitions in Domestic and Regional Systems,
March 2013, available at http://law.case.edu/Academics/AcademicCenters/Cox/WarCrimesResearch Portal!
show document.asp?id=321.
" 3Belgian legislation on combating piracy at sea, art. 4, section 3, Dec. 30, 2009.
-'Inst. of Cetacean Research v. Sea Shepard Conservation Soc'y, 725 F.3d at 947.
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IV
ON THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL WHALING
A. The Decision of the International Court of Justice: 31 March 2014
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) accepted Australia's case against
Japan for breaching obligations under the International Convention for the
Regulation of Whaling (ICRW).'55 Spearheaded by the United States, the
ICRW was signed in 1946 in order to observe the proper conservation of
whale stocks. '56 In 1982, the IWC incorporated Morley in the schedule into
the convention and effectively created a moratorium on Japanese commer-
cial whaling and further incorporated paragraphs in 7(b) of the schedule,
stating, "commercial whaling... is prohibited in a region that is designated
as a southern ocean sanctuary." '157
Naturally, Japan responded to this moratorium by ceasing whaling for
commercial purposes, allegedly, but launched the Japanese Whale Research
Program (JARPA I and II) on this special permit.15 Under the JARPA II
research plan, the court noted that the plan stated that "the sample size is cal-
culated in a range of 800 to 1,000 animals with more than 800 being desir-
able.""'5' In paragraph 195 of the 2014 Australia v. Japan decision, the court
stated that in regards to the minke whale sample size "there was a lack of
transparency regarding the decisions made in selecting these individual sam-
ple sizes.. .,,'6 Further, there was no showing that the sample size was rea-
sonable in relation to achieving the program's objectives when compared
with other possible sample sizes that were required for fuel whales. 6' Japan
essentially flaunted its own permit issuance by using a factory ship in hunt-
ing down the whales.'62 The ICJ ultimately decided that Japan violated three
"'Whaling in the Antarctic (Austl. v. Japan), 2014 I.C.J. 148 (Mar. 31, 2014).
'56See Bowman, supra note 130.
'7See International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, 1946 Schedule, 64th Annual Meeting,
at 3 (2012), available at http://iwc.int/private/downloads/f2cfobr18sg0gc8o4884sgg4w/Schedule-
August-2012.pdf: see also William C.G. Burns & Geoffrey Wandesforde-Smith. The International
Whaling Connission and the Future of Cetaceans in a Changing World, IWC RECtaL 11 199, 201, n. 20
(2002), available at http://www.cbialdia.mardecetaceos.net/archivos/download/burns2006iwc-and
future of cetaceansikl4l69.pdf. Elliot Morley, the UK Minister of Fisheries and Agriculture, gave the
opening speech at the convention, calling for a permanent moratorium on whaling. Id.




1121d. at 67. A factory ship is defined as "one on which whales are treated wholly or in part" and a
whale catcher on board a ship is defined as one "for the purpose of hunting, taking, towing, holding onto
or scouting for whales." Id.
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paragraphs of the Schedule and that the issuance of special permits for
JARPA II was not for purposes of scientific research within the meaning of
article 8. 3
Following the court's decision, an Associated Press article reported that
Tokyo asserted that the Antarctic Program was nearly bankrupt, but ". . . if
the government had overhauled it on its own, it would have incurred the
wrath of a strong anti-whaling lobby, and could have been criticized for cav-
ing in to foreign anti-whaling activists. '' "M Further, with the ICJ decision,
Japanese "officials can say that the courts forced their hand."'65 The article
also pointed out that the ruling was really an example of "'gaiatsu,' the
external pressure that Japan has relied on to bring about change when vest-
ed interests are strong. . . " and that, "[u]nfortunately, Japan cannot change
its policies without gaiatsu and the ruling definitely serves that role to final-
ly bring about a change."'6" The costs of the JARPA programs to Japan are
considerable and were sharply increased by the costs of measures required
to respond to Sea Shepherd's activities such as patrol boats and repairs.'67
The Sea Shepherd protests impact the JARPA programs not only by cur-
tailing the catch, but also by putting Japan into a negative light by interna-
tionally focusing attention on the hunting of the whales. 6 ' The impact of Sea
Shepherd's efforts is tangible as the Japanese fleet returned home at the end
of the 2013/2014 season with only a quarter of its quota (251 minke
whales). 69
However, the remorseful sounding reactions in Japan may have been short
lived, because new press releases appeared thereafter, which stated that
Japan intends to resume whaling in the southern seas.' 7° The Minister of
Agriculture said that Japan would submit a new plan for "research" whaling
to the International Whaling Community this fall. 7 ' Even though the ICJ
questioned whether the program was for research, and pointed out that the
JARPA programs yielded few scientific results, Japan has stated that its 26-
year old research program is needed to monitor whale populations in the
1' ld.







"Japanese Whaling Group Intends to Resunme its Hunts, REUTERS.COM, April 15, 2014, available at
http://www.reuters.con/article/2014/04/15/us-japan-whaling-idUSBREA3E05D20140415.
"''Elaine Lies, Japan will conduct Pacific Whale Hunt in Wake of Court Ruling. REUTERS.COM, April
18, 2014. available at http:/www.reuters.comlarticle/2014/04/18/us-japan-whaling-
idUSBREA3G08C20140418.
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Southern Ocean.' Opponents, however, are calling Japan's assertions a
"crude cover" for the continuation of commercial whaling.'
Environmentalists have said that Japan's decision to continue whaling is
a sign of the political power of conservative members of parliament, who
strive to preserve "whaling as a facet of traditional Japanese culture," which
they perceive is threatened by the demands of foreigners."' In fact, a group
of Japanese pro-whaling politicians called for the revival of the whaling pro-
grams, while making "tongue-in-cheek" demands that whale meat should be
served to President Obama at a state dinner in Japan.' Further, seemingly
undaunted, Japan's minister of agriculture has alluded to plans for new
countermeasures to "thwart unfortunate obstruction activities," presumably
referring to the Sea Shepherd Conservation Society's marine life defense
activities.'76
The ICJ decision will go a long way to add to the Japanese belief that they
can continue to whale under the guise of a new permit system, because now
they can say that the Sea Shepherd members are "pirates" and should be
liable for their interventionist acts.
VI
CONCLUSION
It is really unfortunate that by using the "plain meaning" doctrine to cre-
ate "universal" jurisdiction over crime based on an "expeditious" definition
in UNCLOS, innocent persons can now be subjected to punishment as
pirates rather than tortfeasers. The Ninth Circuit created a new definition for
an eighteenth century crime called piracy. By doing so, it put innocent peo-
ple in danger of harsh treatment. To your authors, it really seems that any
violation committed was perpetrated in the name of the public good, and not
as an offense to the international community and civilized society. The dis-
trict court decision analyzed the events between Sea Shepherd and the
Institute for Cetacean "Research" with a more realistic assessment of the
state of international law and the true meaning of piracy. Of course, the
problem with letting the Sea Shepherd group abscond from any responsibil-
'Martin Fackler, Japan Plans to Resume Whaling Program, With Changes to Address Court
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ity for their acts would be to create a justification for any group in the future
who thought that their cause was proper and just to do the same things and
get away with it. However, the members of the Sea Shepherd group are def-
initely not pirates. They are merely persons that should be held responsible
for any tortious damage they have caused. Of course, now that the ICJ has
decided that the Japanese were violating the ICRW treaty by whaling com-
mercially instead of conducting proper research, courts in the United States
would be remiss to respond to any further pleas for relief from Japan's whal-
ing groups. Thus, in the end, the Sea Shepherd group succeeded in their
goal!
